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Soames	  on	  Frege:	  Provoking	  Thoughts	  
Michael	  Beaney	  	  In	  2003	  Scott	  Soames	  published	  Philosophical	  Analysis	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century,	  a	  two-­‐‑volume	  work	  billed	  as	  a	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy.	  In	  an	  essay	  review	  of	  this	  that	  I	  wrote	  for	  Philosophical	  Books	  (2006),	  I	  commended	  it	  as	  exemplifying	  analytic	  philosophy	  at	  its	  best:	  “clear,	  rigorous,	  and	  with	  great	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  exposition	  of	   arguments”.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  however,	   I	   criticized	   it	   for	  not	  being	  a	  genuine	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy.	  What	  we	  were	  given,	  I	  said,	  was	  “a	  series	  of	  rational	  reconstructions	  and	  criticisms	  of	  selected	  arguments	  in	  the	  history	   of	   analytic	   philosophy,	   chosen	   for	   their	   contributions	   to	   the	  Whiggish	  story	  Soames	  wants	   to	   tell”,	  a	   story	  which	  culminates	   in	  a	  Kripkean	  account	  of	  the	   a	   priori/a	   posteriori,	   necessary/contingent	   and	   analytic/synthetic	  distinctions.	  There	  were	  many	  omissions,	  the	  most	  glaring	  being	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  discussion	  of	  Frege.	  Soames	  had	  attempted	   to	   justify	   this	  omission	  by	  claiming	  that	  much	  of	  Frege’s	  work	  was	  technical,	  deserving	  separate	  treatment	  (2003,	  I,	  p.	  xvii).	  But	  as	  I	  pointed	  out,	  this	  was	  bizarre.	  Soames	  discussed	  Russell’s	  logicist	  project,	   which	   is	   hardly	   any	   less	   technical	   than	   Frege’s;	   and	   Frege’s	   ideas	   on	  sense	  and	  reference,	  to	  take	  just	  one	  example,	  are	  not	  only	  far	  from	  technical	  but	  are	  also	  fundamental	  to	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	  twentieth-­‐‑century	  philosophy	  of	  language.	  	   The	   book	   reviewed	   here	   (in	   part)	   is	   the	   first	   of	   a	   new	   and	   even	   larger	  multivolume	   work	   on	   the	   analytic	   tradition	   (Soames	   2014).	   With	   one	  qualification,	  what	  I	  said	  in	  commending	  the	  earlier	  work	  applies	  here:	  Soames	  sets	  out	   the	  arguments	  as	  he	  reconstructs	   them	   in	  great	  detail,	  with	  premisses	  carefully	   formulated,	   and	   subjects	   them	   to	   rigorous	   critical	   analysis.	   Thinking	  through	   these	   reconstructions	   and	   Soames’	   own	   arguments	   helps	   one	   to	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  deepest	  issues	  in	  analytic	  philosophy.	  The	  qualification	  is	  that	  the	  book	  is	  heavier-­‐‑going	  than	  the	  earlier	  ones.	  As	  he	  writes	  in	  his	  preface,	  “Whereas	   the	  previous	  volumes	  grew	  out	  of	   lectures	   at	  Princeton	   intended	   for	  advanced	  undergraduates	  and	  beginning	  graduate	  students,	   these	  volumes	  will	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be	  more	   demanding”	   (p.	   xi).1	   They	   are	  more	   demanding	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways:	  more	  knowledge	  of	   logic	  and	  the	  technical	  vocabulary	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	   is	  presupposed;	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	  we	  are	  already	   familiar	  with	   the	  basic	  debates	  and	  issues	  in	  analytic	  philosophy,	  at	  least	  as	  they	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  Soames’	  own	  previous	  work;	  and	  one	  will	  struggle	  with	  what	  Soames	  says,	  even	  when	  he	  is	   offering	   summaries,	   if	   one	  has	  not	   read	   the	   relevant	  primary	   texts.	   In	   short,	  Soames	  takes	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  a	  reader	  will	  know	  where	  he	  is	  coming	  from.	  	   So	  how	  does	  it	  fare	  as	  a	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy?	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  are	   five	   volumes	   projected	   suggests	   that	   there	   will	   be	   far	   fewer	   omissions	   to	  complain	  about,	  and	  indeed	  this	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  two	  chapters	  on	  Frege	  (130	  pages),	  with	  which	  the	  first	  volume	  –	  entitled	  ‘The	  Founding	  Giants’	  –	  begins.	   Four	   chapters	   on	  Moore	   (also	   130	   pages)	   and	   six	   chapters	   on	   Russell	  (370	  pages)	  follow,	  so	  there	  is	  still	  an	  imbalance,	  in	  my	  view,	  but	  at	  least	  we	  get	  an	  account	  of	  Frege	  to	  start.	  It	  is	  this	  account	  of	  Frege	  that	  I	  discuss	  here.	  	   The	   first	   chapter	   is	   entitled	   ‘Foundations	   of	   Logic,	   Language,	   and	  Mathematics’	   and	   offers	   an	   exposition	   of	   Frege’s	   logic	   and	   his	   logicist	   project.	  The	  second	  chapter	  is	  called	  ‘Critical	  Challenges’	  and	  takes	  up	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  in	  Frege’s	  philosophy:	  his	  analysis	  of	  existential	   statements,	  his	  doctrine	  of	   the	  ‘unsaturatedness’	   of	   concepts,	   his	   conception	   of	   truth,	   his	   account	   of	   identity	  statements,	   his	   hierarchy	   of	   senses,	   the	   transparency	   of	   thoughts,	   indexicality,	  the	   epistemology	   of	   his	   logicist	   reduction,	   and	   Russell’s	   paradox.	   I	   cannot	  consider	  all	   these	   issues	  here.	   I	   shall	  merely	  offer	   some	  remarks	  on	  a	  problem	  that	  brings	  together	  a	  number	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  Soames	  discusses:	  the	  problem	  of	   the	   criterion	   of	   identity	   for	   thoughts.	   Before	   doing	   so,	   though,	   let	   me	   say	  something	  about	  the	  initial	  exposition	  and	  make	  some	  general	  comments	  about	  his	  account	  of	  Frege.	  	   In	   a	   projected	   five-­‐‑volume	   history	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   one	   might	  expect	  a	  first	  chapter	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  historical	  background	  to	  set	  the	  scene.	   What	   were	   the	   key	   philosophical	   debates	   and	   movements	   in	   the	  nineteenth	   century?	   What	   were	   the	   developments	   in	   mathematics	   that	   both	  inspired	  and	  made	  possible	  Frege’s	  and	  Russell’s	  logicist	  projects?	  Many	  analytic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  page	  references	  will	  be	  to	  Soames	  2014.	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philosophers	   from	   Frege,	   Russell	   and	   Moore	   onwards	   have	   criticized	   Kant’s	  views,	   such	   as	   his	   transcendental	   idealism	   and	   conception	   of	   the	   synthetic	   a	  priori.	   So	  what	   problems	   did	   Kant’s	   philosophy	   raise?	   The	   nineteenth	   century	  saw	  a	  range	  of	  different	  responses,	  including	  various	  forms	  of	  German	  idealism,	  neo-­‐‑Kantianism,	  scientific	  naturalism,	  psychologism,	  historicism,	  positivism,	  and	  British	   idealism,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   beginnings	   of	   phenomenology.	   So	   where	   does	  analytic	  philosophy	  fit	  into	  this	  bigger	  picture?	  Were	  there	  assumptions	  that	  the	  early	   analytic	   philosophers	   shared	   with	   their	   immediate	   predecessors	   and	  contemporaries?	  Was	  there	  a	  sense	  at	  the	  time	  of	  any	  intellectual	  crises	  that	  may	  have	   contributed	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   analytic	   philosophy?	   Was	   indeed	   it	  recognized	  as	  a	  new	  form	  of	  philosophy	  when	  it	  emerged?	  	   Soames’	   first	   volume	   begins	   with	   a	   short	   preface	   that	   summarizes	   its	  contents,	   but	   there	   is	   nothing	   at	   all	   that	   even	   raises	   these	   questions,	   let	   alone	  offers	   any	   answers.2	   Are	  we	  meant	   to	   already	   know	   this	   background?	   Or	   is	   it	  seen	  as	  irrelevant?	  The	  first	  chapter	  launches	  straight	  into	  a	  60-­‐‑page	  exposition	  of	  Frege’s	  basic	  ideas.	  There	  is	  an	  ‘overview’	  at	  the	  start,	  but	  this	  amounts	  to	  less	  than	   two	   pages:	   the	   first	   paragraph	   provides	   a	   15-­‐‑line	   biography,	   the	   second	  paragraph	   summarizes	   Frege’s	  main	  works,	   and	   the	   third	   and	   final	   paragraph	  introduces	  what	  follows.	  His	  discussion	  in	  this	  first	  chapter,	  Soames	  writes,	  “will	  not	  strictly	  follow	  the	  chronological	  development	  of	  Frege’s	  thought”	  (p.	  5).	  This	  is	   an	   understatement.	   There	   is	   little	   indication	   that	   Frege’s	   thought	   had	   any	  development	  at	  all.	  We	  are	  given	  a	  specification	  of	  “a	  simple	  logical	   language	  …	  presented	   in	  a	  more	  convenient	  symbolism	  than	   the	  one	  Frege	  used”	  (p.	  5),	  an	  account	  of	  the	  sense/reference	  distinction,	  a	  discussion	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  logic,	  a	   summary	   of	   the	  main	   ideas	   of	  The	   Foundations	   of	   Arithmetic,	   and	   a	   brief	   (6-­‐‑page)	  sketch	  of	  his	  logicist	  reduction.	  	   In	   his	   pioneering	   book,	   Frege:	   Philosophy	   of	   Language	   (1973),	   Michael	  Dummett	   notoriously	   claimed	   that	   the	   logical	   theory	   presented	   in	   Frege’s	  
Begriffsschrift	  of	  1879	  “is	  astonishing	  because	  it	  has	  no	  predecessors:	  it	  appears	  to	   have	   been	   born	   from	   Frege’s	   brain	   unfertilized	   by	   external	   influences”	   (p.	  xxxv).	  As	  I	  have	  remarked	  elsewhere	  (2013b,	  p.	  250),	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  a	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  essays	  that	  do	  raise	  these	  questions	  and	  offer	  answers,	  see	  Beaney	  2013a.	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absurd	  claim	  about	  an	  historical	  event:	  it	  is	  like	  a	  biologist	  announcing	  a	  case	  of	  spontaneous	   generation.	   Of	   course	   there	   were	   influences	   on	   Frege’s	   logical	  theory,	  most	  importantly,	  the	  mathematical	  theory	  of	  functions,	  which	  had	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  on	  which	  Frege	  had	  himself	  worked	  in	  his	  Habilitationsschrift	  of	  1874.	  Even	  the	  name	  ‘Begriffsschrift’	  was	  not	  new.3	  	   Soames	  makes	  no	  such	  absurd	  claim,	  but	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  his	  account	  to	  show	  how	  wrong	  this	  claim	  is.	  Soames	  proceeds	  as	   if	  Frege’s	   logic	  –	  and	  all	  his	  philosophical	   ideas	   –	   were	   unfertilized	   by	   external	   influences.	   Indeed,	   he	   also	  proceeds	   as	   if	   Frege’s	   earlier	   ideas	   had	   no	   influence	   on	   his	   later	   ideas.	   The	  distinction	   between	   sense	   and	   reference,	   for	   example,	   was	   motivated	   by	   the	  problems	   that	   Frege	   came	   to	   realize	   that	   his	   own	   earlier	   notion	   of	   ‘content’	  faced.4	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  this	  in	  Soames’	  account	  of	  the	  distinction,	  which	  is	  simply	  explained	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  solve	  ‘Frege’s	  puzzle’,	  understood	  as	  a	  timeless	  problem	   concerning	   the	   substitutability	   of	   co-­‐‑referential	   terms	   in	   a	   sentence.	  Why	  was	  such	  a	  puzzle	  a	  problem	  for	  Frege?	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  threatens	  principles	  of	  compositionality,	  as	  Soames	  discusses.	  But	  why	  was	  this	  important	  in	  the	  overall	  context	  of	  Frege’s	  logicism?	  We	  are	  not	  told.	  A	  history	  of	  (Frege’s	  role	  in)	  analytic	  philosophy	  should	  surely	  address	  such	  a	  fundamental	  question.	  This	  is	   just	  one	  example	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  concern	  with	  the	  development	  of	  Frege’s	  thought	  or	  any	  of	  the	  influences	  upon	  it.	  	   Scholarship	   has	   come	   a	   long	   way	   since	   Dummett’s	   pioneering	   book,	  published	  more	  than	  40	  years	  ago.	  Dummett	  himself,	  despite	  some	  initial	  kicking	  and	   screaming	   (Dummett	   1981),	   came	   to	   recognize	   the	   importance	   of	   locating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   For	   an	   account	   of	   this,	   see	   Thiel	   2005.	   Incidentally,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   ‘Overview’	   to	   his	   first	  chapter,	  Soames	  writes:	  “In	  what	  follows	  I	  refer	  to	  Frege’s	  works	  under	  their	  English	  titles—with	  the	   exception	   of	   the	   Begriffsschrift,	   the	   awkwardness	   of	   the	   English	   translation	   of	   which	   is	  prohibitive”	  (p.	  5).	  ‘Begriffsschrift’	  literally	  means	  ‘concept-­‐‑script’,	  ‘Begriff’	  meaning	  ‘concept’	  and	  ‘Schrift’	  meaning	  ‘script’.	  I	  see	  nothing	  awkward	  about	  this;	  if	  anything,	  the	  German	  term	  is	  more	  awkward,	   certainly	   when	   used	   as	   an	   English	   word.	   I	   use	   ‘Begriffsschrift’	   myself,	   however,	  because	   that	   is	   the	   name	   that	   Frege	   gave	   to	   his	   logical	   system	   and	   it	   reminds	   us	   that	  we	   are	  indeed	  talking	  about	  Frege’s	  own	  ‘concept-­‐‑script’	  or	  ‘conceptual	  notation’	  (to	  use	  the	  two	  terms	  that	  have	  often	  been	  used	  to	  translate	  Frege’s	  term).	  4	  Something	  similar	  can	  be	  said	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Russell:	  his	  theory	  of	  descriptions	  was	  motivated	  by	  the	  problems	  that	  he	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  his	  own	  earlier	  theory	  of	  denoting	  faced	  (given	  other	  commitments	   he	   had).	   This	  was	   something	   that	   Soames	   ignored	   in	   his	   earlier	   2-­‐‑volume	  work	  (2003),	  and	  was	  criticized	  for.	  It	   is	  good	  to	  see	  that	  he	  considers	  Russell’s	  earlier	  theory	  in	  this	  new	   5-­‐‑volume	   work.	   Perhaps	   we	   will	   have	   to	   wait	   for	   the	   next	   8-­‐‑volume	   work	   to	   find	   more	  justice	  being	  done	  to	  the	  development	  of	  Frege’s	  philosophy.	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Frege	  in	  the	  broader	  history	  of	  philosophy	  (see	  e.g.	  Dummett	  1988)	  and	  his	  later	  book	  on	  Frege’s	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  (1991)	  is	  much	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  development	   of	   Frege’s	   thinking.	   But	   whilst	   Soames	   refers	   to	   Dummett’s	   first	  book,5	   there	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   any	   of	   his	   later	   books	   or	   papers.	   In	   fact,	   the	  reference	   to	   any	   of	   the	   literature	   that	   has	   since	   been	   written	   on	   Frege	   is	  astonishingly	   thin.	   Other	   than	   Dummett	   1973	   and	   writings	   by	   either	   him	   or	  Nathan	  Salmon,	  Soames	  only	  refers	  in	  the	  two	  chapters	  on	  Frege	  to	  the	  following	  works	   on	   Frege	   (in	   alphabetical	   order):	   Beaney	   1996,	   Burgess	   2005,	   Currie	  1982,	   Dejnozka	   1981,	   1996,	   Kripke	   2008,	   Perry	   1977,	   1979,	   Thau	   and	   Caplan	  2000,	   Yourgrau	   1982,	   1986–87.6	   Of	   these,	   Currie’s	   introduction	   to	   Frege’s	  philosophy	  receives	  by	  far	  the	  most	  citations	  (twelve	  in	  all),	  suggesting	  that	  for	  Soames,	  the	  literature	  on	  Frege	  pretty	  much	  stopped	  in	  1982.	  Currie’s	  book	  is	  a	  fine	   introduction	   (and	  was	  useful	   to	  me	  when	   I	  was	   a	   graduate	   student	   in	   the	  mid-­‐‑1980s	  trying	  to	  wean	  myself	  off	  Dummett’s	  Frege),	  but	  to	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  little	  else	  worth	  reading	  is	  inexcusable.	  	   Here	   is	   a	   list	   of	   some	   of	   the	   philosophers	   who	   have	   made	   important	  contributions	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   Frege’s	   philosophy	   since	   Dummett’s	  pioneering	  work	  (again	  in	  alphabetical	  order):	  Gordon	  Baker,	  David	  Bell,	  Patricia	  Blanchette,	  George	  Boolos,	  Robert	  Brandom,	  Tyler	  Burge,	  Wolfgang	  Carl,	   James	  Conant,	   William	   Demopoulos,	   Cora	   Diamond,	   Gareth	   Evans,	   Juliet	   Floyd,	  Gottfried	   Gabriel,	   Warren	   Goldfarb,	   Dirk	   Greimann,	   Leila	   Haaparanta,	   Peter	  Hacker,	   Bob	   Hale,	   Richard	   Heck,	   Wolfgang	   Kienzler,	   Lothar	   Kreiser,	   Michael	  Kremer,	   Wolfgang	   Künne,	   James	   Levine,	   Danielle	   Macbeth,	   Robert	   May,	   John	  McDowell,	   Ulrich	   Pardey,	   Eva	   Picardi,	   Michael	   Potter,	   Erich	   Reck,	   Thomas	  Ricketts,	   Matthias	   Schirn,	   Peter	   Simons,	   Hans	   Sluga,	   Peter	   Sullivan,	   Jamie	  Tappenden,	  William	   Taschek,	  Mark	   Textor,	   Christian	   Thiel,	   Charles	   Travis,	   Kai	  Wehmeier,	   Joan	  Weiner,	   David	  Wiggins,	  Mark	  Wilson,	   Crispin	  Wright.	   None	   of	  their	  work	  on	  Frege	  is	  even	  mentioned	  by	  Soames.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   It	   is	   inaccurately	   cited	   in	   the	   bibliography,	   however.	   This	   is	   not	   the	   only	   error	   in	   the	  bibliography.	  6	  There	  are	  a	  few	  other	  references	  to	  works	  not	  specifically	  on	  Frege,	  such	  as	  Kneale	  and	  Kneale	  1962	  and	  Kaplan	  1977.	  There	  are	  also	  a	  couple	  of	  other	  works	  on	  Frege	  cited	  in	  the	  bibliography	  –	  Rayo	  2002	  and	  Resnik	  1980	  –	  which	  are	  not	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  two	  chapters	  on	  Frege.	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   Anyone	  who	   knows	   the	  writings	   of	   at	   least	   some	   of	   these	   philosophers	  will	  know	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  debated:	  the	  German	  (mathematical	  and	  philosophical)	  influences	  on	  Frege,	  the	  changes	  in	  Frege’s	  thinking	  and	  in	  his	  logical	   system	   itself	   from	   the	  Begriffsschrift	   to	   the	  Basic	   Laws,	   the	   tensions	   in	  Frege’s	   early	   notion	   of	   content,	   Frege’s	   ‘universalist’	   conception	   of	   logic,	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   Frege	   pursues	   metalogical	   investigations,	   the	   relationship	  between	   judgement	   and	   truth,	   Frege’s	   conception	   of	   self-­‐‑evidence,	   the	  ‘unsayability’	   of	   the	   concept/object	  distinction,	   the	   significance	  of	   ‘elucidation’,	  the	  paradox	  of	   analysis,	   the	  distinction	  between	   ‘analysis’	   and	   ‘decomposition’,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  context	  principle,	  the	  problem	  of	  senses	  without	  referents,	  Frege’s	  view	   on	   vagueness,	   the	   translation	   of	   ‘Bedeutung’	   and	   its	   use	   in	   the	   case	   of	  names,	  concept-­‐‑words	  and	  sentences,	  the	  rediscovery	  of	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  Frege’s	  theorem,	  the	  status	  of	  Hume’s	  (or,	  as	  it	  is	  better	  called,	  the	  Cantor-­‐‑Hume)	  Principle,	   the	   question	   of	   how	  much	   of	   Frege’s	   logicism	   can	   be	   reconstructed,	  and	  Frege’s	  theory	  of	  real	  numbers,	  to	  mention	  some	  of	  the	  most	  obvious	  issues.7	  One	   or	   two	   of	   them	   are	   touched	   on	   briefly	   by	   Soames,	   but	   the	   vast	   majority	  receive	  no	  consideration	  at	  all.	  	   Does	   this	   matter?	   In	   two	   chapters	   (130	   pages),	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   do	  justice	   to	   all	   the	   topics	   that	   have	   been	   debated	   in	   the	   burgeoning	   secondary	  literature	   on	   Frege.	   But	   in	   a	   work	   that	   claims	   to	   offer	   a	   definitive	   history	   of	  analytic	  philosophy	  (as	  announced	  on	  the	  inside	  front	  cover),	  one	  would	  expect	  at	  least	  some	  mention	  of	  these	  topics,	  if	  only	  in	  footnotes.	  Any	  reader	  should	  be	  made	  aware	  of	  what	   issues	  have	  been	  debated,	  with	  references	   to	   the	  relevant	  literature	  provided	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  explore	  the	  issues	  themselves	  and	  make	  up	  their	  own	  mind	  should	  they	  wish.	  Not	  to	  acquaint	  oneself	  with	  the	  key	  debates	  in	  a	   given	   area	   is	   a	   failing	   of	   scholarship	   and	   not	   to	   mention	   them	   in	   writing	   a	  supposedly	  definitive	  book	  in	  the	  field	  is	  a	  failing	  of	  duty.	  	   Even	  with	   Soames’	   own	  purposes	   in	  mind,	   this	   is	   unfortunate.	   Three	   of	  the	   issues	   just	  mentioned,	   which	   are	   interrelated,	   illustrate	   this.	   Over	   the	   last	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  a	  guide	  through	  the	  literature,	  see	  the	  entry	  on	  Frege	  in	  the	  online	  ‘Oxford	  Bibliographies’	  (Beaney	  2014).	  For	  a	  4-­‐‑volume	  collection	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  papers	  published	  between	  1986	  and	  2005,	  see	  Beaney	  and	  Reck	  2005.	  The	  introductions	  to	  these	  four	  volumes	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  were	  debated	  in	  this	  period	  –	  all	  of	  which	  are	  still	  being	  discussed	  today.	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thirty	   years	   there	   has	   been	   a	   huge	   renaissance	   of	   interest	   in	   Frege’s	   logicism,	  beginning	   with	   Crispin	   Wright’s	   book	   on	   Frege’s	   conception	   of	   numbers	   as	  objects	   (published	   in	  1983,	   so	   just	   a	   year	   after	  Currie’s	   book).	  Wright	  was	   the	  first	   to	   rediscover	   Frege’s	   theorem	   –	   that	   the	   Dedekind-­‐‑Peano	   Axioms	   can	   be	  deduced,	   within	   second-­‐‑order	   logic,	   from	   the	   Cantor-­‐‑Hume	   Principle,	   the	  principle	   that	   states	   that	   the	  number	  of	  Fs	   is	   equal	   to	   the	  number	  of	  Gs	   iff	   the	  concept	  F	  is	  equinumerous	  [gleichzahlig]	  to	  the	  concept	  G	  (i.e.,	  the	  Fs	  and	  the	  Gs	  can	   be	   one–one	   correlated).	   This	   led	   to	   discussion	   (by	   Bob	   Hale	   and	   Crispin	  Wright,	  among	  others)	  of	  whether	  the	  Cantor-­‐‑Hume	  Principle	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  logical	  and	  to	  detailed	  investigation	  (especially	  by	  Richard	  Heck)	  of	  exactly	  how	  much	  of	  Frege’s	  logicist	  project	  can	  be	  resurrected.8	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  logic,	  analyticity,	  sameness	  of	  sense,	  and	  so	  on,	  which	  are	  precisely	  among	   Soames’	   own	  main	   concerns,	   so	   it	   is	   baffling	   that	   this	   recent	   work	   on	  Frege	   is	   ignored	   in	   his	   book.	   At	   the	   very	   end	   of	   the	   first	   chapter	   we	   get	   two	  sentences	  that	  do	  allude	  to	  this	  neo-­‐‑Fregean	  project,	  with	  a	  solitary	  reference	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Burgess	  (2005).	  But	  that	  is	  all.	  This	  is	  a	  real	  lost	  opportunity.	  	   Reading	   more	   of	   the	   secondary	   literature	   –	   and	   indeed,	   more	   of	   the	  primary	  literature	  –	  would	  also	  have	  helped	  in	  appreciating	  the	  development	  of	  Frege’s	   thought.	   There	   are	   all	   sorts	   of	   little	   ways	   in	   which	   Soames’	   failure	   to	  appreciate	   this	   leads	   to	   distortions	   and	   errors	   in	   his	   account.	   In	   explaining	  Frege’s	   logic,	   for	   example,	   he	  writes:	   “⎡∀xΦx⎤	   is	   true	   iff	   every	   object	   o	   is	   such	  that	  the	  concept	  designated	  by	  Φx	  assigns	  o	  the	  value	  the	  True	  iff	  o	  “satisfies”	  the	  
formula	  Φx	  iff	  replacing	  occurrences	  of	  ‘x’	  in	  Φx	  with	  a	  name	  n	  for	  o	  would	  result	  in	  
a	  true	  sentence.	  This	  is	  Frege’s	  breakthrough	  insight—creating	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	   new	   logic	   of	   quantification—into	   how	   quantificational	   sentences	   are	   to	   be	  understood.”	   (p.	   10)	   Aside	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   talk	   of	   ‘satisfying’	   here	   is	  anachronistic,	  Frege’s	  idea	  of	  concepts	  as	  functions	  that	  map	  objects	  onto	  truth-­‐‑values,	   which	   is	   alluded	   to	   here,	   was	   not	   actually	   formulated	   until	   1891	   (in	  ‘Function	  and	  Concept’),	  some	  12	  years	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  quantificational	  logic	  in	   the	   Begriffsschrift.	   So	   it	   cannot	   have	   been	   the	   ‘breakthrough	   insight’.	   (It	   is	  surely	  absurd,	  in	  any	  case,	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  sophisticated	  thought	  Soames	  here	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  references,	  see	  the	  relevant	  sections	  of	  Beaney	  2014	  (cited	  in	  the	  previous	  note).	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articulates	   could	  possibly	  have	  been	   the	  breakthrough	   insight!	  Did	  Frege	  wake	  up	  one	  morning	   in	  1877	  or	  so,	  no	  doubt	  unfertilized	  by	  any	  external	   influence,	  with	   (a	   German	   version	   of)	   such	   a	   sentence	   in	   his	   head?)	   The	   story	   of	   his	  creation	  of	  quantificational	  logic	  needs	  far	  more	  careful	  handling.	  	   Other	  examples	  could	  be	  given.	  More	  justice	  could	  be	  done	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Frege	   stops	   talking	   of	   the	   ‘analyticity’	   of	   arithmetic	   after	   1884	   (pace	   what	  Soames	  implies	  on	  e.g.	  pp.	  13	  and	  87),	  to	  Frege’s	  preference	  for	  the	  term	  ‘mode	  of	  determination’	  rather	  than	  ‘mode	  of	  presentation’	  in	  explaining	  sense	  (Soames	  uses	   the	   latter	   throughout	   his	   discussion),9	   and	   to	   the	   problems	   caused	   in	  Frege’s	  central	  argument	  in	  the	  Foundations	  by	  his	  failure	  to	  distinguish	  ‘Inhalt’,	  ‘Sinn’	  and	  ‘Bedeutung’	  (which	  Soames	  glosses	  over	  on	  pp.	  46–7).	  I	  also	  think	  that	  Soames	  gets	  the	  story	  wrong	  (on	  pp.	  86–96)	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Frege’s	  account	  of	  identity	  statements	  in	  the	  Begriffsschrift	  and	  his	  famous	  argument	  at	  the	   beginning	   of	   ‘On	   Sense	   and	   Reference’,	   but	   that	   would	   require	   more	  explanation	   than	   I	   have	   space	   here	   to	   provide.10	   Throughout	   his	   two	   chapters	  Soames	  also	  uses	  the	  terms	   ‘mean’	  and	   ‘meaning’	   in	  ways	  that	  are	  confusing	   in	  contexts	  where	  ‘sense’	  and	  ‘reference’	  are	  being	  discussed	  (e.g.	  on	  pp.	  71–2).	  	   As	   I	   was	   reading	   Soames’	   account	   of	   Frege,	   there	   were	   quite	   a	   few	  occasions	  on	  which	  I	  found	  myself	  thinking,	  “Yes,	  but	  if	  you	  look	  a	  little	  further	  on	   in	   the	   text	   from	  which	  you	  are	   citing,	   then	  you	  will	   find	  an	  answer	   to	  your	  criticism”,	   or	   “Ok,	   but	   if	   you	   look	   at	   this	   other	   text,	   then	  you	  will	   find	   that	   the	  issue	   is	   more	   complex”.	   I	   had	   the	   latter	   reaction,	   for	   example,	   in	   reading	   his	  critique	  of	  Frege’s	  treatment	  of	  existence	  (pp.	  60–70).	  A	  key	  text,	  which	  Soames	  does	  not	  consider,	  is	  his	  ‘Dialogue	  with	  Pünjer	  on	  Existence’,	  where	  Frege	  makes	  clear	  his	  view	  that	  our	  use	  of	  names,	  in	  scientific	  contexts,	  presupposes	  that	  they	  are	  not	   empty.11	  This	   is	   the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   coin	   to	  his	   analysis	   of	   existential	  statements	  as	  involving	  an	  assertion	  about	  a	  concept.	  I	  had	  the	  former	  reaction,	  for	  example,	  in	  reading	  what	  Soames	  says	  about	  the	  epistemological	  motivation	  for	   Frege’s	   logicist	   reduction	   (pp.	   114–20).	   Citing	   a	   passage	   from	   ‘Logic	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  pointed	  out	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  in	  my	  introduction	  to	  Frege	  1997:	  pp.	  22–24.	  10	  I	  gave	  my	  own	  story	  in	  Beaney	  1996,	  ch.	  6;	  summarized	  in	  Beaney	  2011,	  §5.	  I	  also	  discuss	  the	  problems	   in	   Frege’s	   early	   notion	   of	   content	   and	   why	   identity	   statements	   were	   important	   for	  Frege	  in	  Beaney	  2007.	  See	  also	  Kremer	  2010;	  Textor	  2011,	  esp.	  ch.	  4.	  11	  The	  dialogue,	  which	  took	  place	  some	  time	  before	  1884,	  is	  translated	  in	  Frege	  1979,	  pp.	  53–67.	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Mathematics’	   (1914),	   he	   criticizes	   Frege	   for	   treating	   his	   logicist	   definitions	   as	  ‘analytic	   definitions’	   that	   require	   an	   act	   of	   ‘immediate	   insight’	   to	   be	   seen	   as	  correct.	   But	   Frege	   himself	   replies	   to	   this	   criticism	   in	   the	   very	   next	   three	  paragraphs,	  which	  Soames	  simply	  ignores.	  What	  Frege	  says	  in	  these	  paragraphs	  is	   extremely	   significant.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   it	   offers	   Frege’s	   most	   considered	  response	  to	  the	  paradox	  of	  analysis.12	  With	  Soames’	  own	  interests	  in	  mind,	  this	  represents	  another	  missed	  opportunity.	  	   This	  is	  an	  appropriate	  point	  on	  which	  to	  conclude	  my	  review	  by	  turning	  to	   what	   I	   found	   most	   interesting	   in	   Soames’	   account	   of	   Frege.	   In	   the	   second	  chapter	  he	  discusses	  nine	  ‘critical	  challenges’,	  which	  might	  easily	  be	  read	  as	  nine	  separate	  problems	  that	  he	  detects	  in	  Frege’s	  philosophy.	  Weaving	  in	  and	  out	  of	  his	   criticisms,	   however,	   is	   a	   central	   theme	   that	   provides	   more	   unity	   to	   those	  criticisms	  than	  he	  himself	  does	  justice	  to.	  Certainly,	  if	  the	  theme	  had	  been	  made	  more	  explicit	  from	  early	  on,	  then	  it	  might	  have	  given	  more	  shape	  to	  his	  critique,	  which	  comes	  across	  as	   fragmentary.	  This	   is	   the	   theme	  of	  Frege’s	   conception	  of	  thought,	   reflected,	   in	   particular,	   in	   the	   question	   of	   the	   criterion	   of	   identity	   for	  thoughts.	   Frege	   himself	   offers	   different	   formulations	   of	   such	   a	   criterion	   in	  different	   places,	   even	   in	   the	   same	   year.	   In	   ‘A	   Brief	   Survey	   of	   my	   Logical	  Doctrines’,	  dating	  from	  1906,	  for	  example,	  he	  offers	  a	  very	  fine-­‐‑grained	  criterion:	  two	  sentences	  express	  the	  same	  thought	  iff	  anyone	  who	  recognizes	  the	  content	  of	  one	  as	  true	  must	  immediately	  recognize	  the	  content	  of	  the	  other	  as	  true,	  and	  vice	   versa.13	   In	   a	   letter	   to	  Husserl	   also	  dating	   from	  1906,	  however,	   he	   states	   a	  much	   coarser-­‐‑grained	   criterion:	   essentially	   logical	   equivalence	   (with	   some	  qualifications).14	   Other	   criteria	   can	   be	   formulated	   from	   remarks	   Frege	   makes	  elsewhere,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  criteria	  –	  which	  usually	  fall	  somewhere	  between	  the	  two	   Frege	   himself	   offered	   in	   1906	   –	   have	   been	   offered	   and	   debated	   in	   the	  secondary	  literature.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	   See	   e.g.	   Beaney	   1996,	   ch.	   5;	   2005.	   Incidentally,	   the	   term	   ‘analytic	   definition’	   is	   potentially	  misleading.	   It	   translates	   ‘zerlegende	   Definition’,	   not	   ‘analytische	   Definition’.	   It	   contrasts	   with	  ‘aufbauende	  Definition’,	   as	   I	  point	  out	   in	  an	  editorial	  note	   to	   the	  passage	  as	   reprinted	   in	  Frege	  1997,	  p.	  316.	  13	  See	  Frege	  1997,	  pp.	  299–300.	  14	  See	  Frege	  1997,	  pp.	  305–6.	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   This	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	   articulate	   a	   criterion	   that	   captures	   as	   many	   of	  Frege’s	  views	  as	  possible.15	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  end,	  one	  must	  recognize	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ineliminable	  tension	  in	  Frege’s	  philosophy	  –	  as	  Soames	  brings	  out	  very	  well	  in	  his	  own	  account,	  especially	   in	  his	  discussion	  of	   indexicality	   (cf.	  p.	  110).	  Frege’s	  fine-­‐‑grained	  criterion	  suggests	  that	  he	  endorses	  a	  transparency	  principle	  –	  that	  “two	  sentences	  that	  express	  the	  same	  thought	  will	  be	  recognized	  as	  making	  the	  same	  or	  equivalent	  claims	  by	  anyone	  who	  understands	  them”,	  as	  Soames	  puts	  it	  (p.	   73).	   But	   as	   Frege	   himself	   repeatedly	   stressed,	   the	   same	   thought	   can	   be	  expressed	   in	   sentences	   of	   radically	   different	   form:	   we	   might	   call	   this	   his	  transformation	  principle.16	  So	  there	  might	  indeed	  be	  hard	  conceptual	  work	  to	  be	  done	  in	  coming	  to	  recognize	  that	  two	  sentences	  express	  the	  same	  thought,	  which	  pushes	   us	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   a	   coarser-­‐‑grained	   criterion.	   The	   problem	   of	   the	  status	  of	   the	  Cantor-­‐‑Hume	  Principle	   is	  precisely	   a	   site	  where	   the	   transparency	  and	  transformation	  principles	  collide.	  	   The	  tension	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  Frege’s	  whole	  project	  of	  analysis,	  not	   just	  his	   logicist	  definitions	  but	  also	  his	   logical	   elucidations.	  The	  problem	   is	  obvious	  in	  the	  case	  of	  his	  logicism:	  does	  making	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  number	  0,	  for	  example,	   really	   express	   the	   same	   thought	   as	   making	   the	   corresponding	   claim	  about	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  concept	  equinumerous	  with	  the	  concept	   ‘not	   identical	  
with	   itself’?	  Frege’s	   logicist	  definitions	  hardly	   seem	  obviously	   true.	  But	  Soames	  raises	  the	  same	  objection	  to	  Frege’s	  explanation	  of	  his	  most	  basic	   logical	   ideas:	  ‘Jesus	   is	   a	  man’	   and	   ‘Jesus	   falls	   under	   the	   concept	  man’,	   for	   example,	   arguably	  express	   different	   thoughts	   (pp.	   71	   ff.).	   However,	   this	   threatens	   logical	   theory	  itself.17	  (And	  if	  ‘Jesus	  falls	  under	  the	  concept	  man’	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  ‘re-­‐‑expressed’	  as	  ‘The	  first-­‐‑level	  concept	  man	   falls	  within	  the	  second-­‐‑level	  concept	   is	   instantiated	  
by	   Jesus’,	  and	  so	  on,	   then	  a	  whole	  hierarchy	  of	   thoughts	  can	  be	  generated,	  each	  higher	  one	  looking	  less	  and	  less	  like	  the	  one	  we	  started	  with.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Beaney	  1996,	  §8.1.	  16	  See	  e.g.	  ‘On	  Concept	  and	  Object’:	  “we	  must	  not	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  same	  sense,	  the	  same	  thought,	  may	  be	  variously	  expressed	  …	  If	  all	  transformation	  of	  the	  expression	  were	  forbidden	  on	  the	  plea	  that	  this	  would	  alter	  the	  content	  as	  well,	  logic	  would	  simply	  be	  crippled;	  for	  the	  task	  of	  logic	   can	   hardly	   be	   performed	  without	   trying	   to	   recognize	   the	   thought	   in	   its	  manifold	   guises.”	  (1997,	  pp.	  184–5,	  fn.	  G)	  17	  Cf.	  the	  passage	  quoted	  from	  ‘On	  Concept	  and	  Object’	  in	  the	  previous	  note.	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   What	  is	  lurking	  under	  all	  of	  this	  is	  the	  paradox	  of	  analysis.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   however,	   this	   is	   where	   Frege’s	   discussion	   in	   ‘Logic	   in	   Mathematics’	   at	  least	   suggests	   a	   way	   forward.	   The	   aim	   of	   logical	   analysis,	   Frege	   writes,	   is	   to	  articulate	   senses	   clearly.18	  Rephrasing	   ‘Jesus	   is	   a	  man’	   as	   ‘Jesus	   falls	   under	   the	  concept	  man’	  is	  precisely	  a	  way	  of	  clarifying	  its	  sense.	  In	  the	  process	  we	  come	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  two	  sentences	  have	  –	  or	  count	  as	  having	  –	  the	  same	  sense.	  We	  also	  learn,	  in	  other	  words,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  talk	  of	  ‘expressing	  the	  same	  thought’:	  the	   appropriate	   notion	   of	   thought	   is	   crystallized	   out	   in	   the	   very	   process	   of	  (re)conceptualization.	  Admittedly,	  however,	  developing	  Frege’s	  response	  in	  this	  way	   is	   to	   go	   beyond	   what	   he	   himself	   says	   in	   ‘Logic	   in	   Mathematics’.	   It	   also	  requires	  us	  to	  give	  up	  –	  or	  at	  least	  qualify	  –	  the	  Platonism	  about	  thoughts	  that	  he	  was	  to	  articulate	  so	  famously	  four	  years	  later,	  in	  ‘Der	  Gedanke’	  (1918).	  But	  that,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  go.	  	   I	   can	   only	   gesture	   here	   at	   what	   I	   think	   is	   the	   underlying	   philosophical	  issue	  in	  Soames’	  account	  (the	  paradox	  of	  analysis)	  and	  how	  it	  might	  be	  resolved	  (by	   recognizing	   the	   dynamic	   and	   conceptually	   constructive	   character	   of	   our	  processes	  of	  analysis).	  But	  I	  hope	  this	  is	  enough	  to	  indicate	  my	  main	  criticism	  of	  Soames’	  account:	  he	  could	  and	  should	  have	  made	  much	  more	  of	  this	  issue.	  One’s	  first	   impression	   of	   his	   exposition	   in	   chapter	   1	   and	   his	   ‘critical	   challenges’	   in	  chapter	   2	   is	   of	   simply	   setting	   Frege	   up	   to	   be	   dismembered.	   But	   Frege’s	  philosophy	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  just	  a	  collection	  of	  errors	  and	  dead	  ends,	  but	  as	  a	  source	  of	  new	  ideas,	  concepts	  and	  arguments	  –	  and	  yes,	  problems	  and	  tensions	  as	  well	  –	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  can	  think	  through	  some	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  issues	   of	   analytic	   philosophy	   as	   it	   developed	   subsequently.	   Thinking	   through	  such	   issues	   is	   precisely	   the	   task	   that	   Soames	   has	   set	   himself	   in	   his	   admirably	  ambitious	   new	   multivolume	   work	   on	   the	   analytic	   tradition.	   In	   his	   first	   two	  chapters	  on	  Frege	  there	  is	  certainly	  material	  that	  contributes	  to	  this	  in	  a	  thought-­‐‑provoking	  way.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Frege	  1997,	  p.	  317.	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